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Social Movements and the Politics of Debt Cancellation
Soren Ambrose*
The question of sovereign debt restructuring has come up in the last three
years, primarily in response to the plight of Argentina, which in 2001 was forced
into the largest governmental default in recent decades. The Sovereign Debt
Restructuring Mechanism ("SDRM") proposed by the International Monetary
Fund ("IMF") in 2002, while failing to win approval from the institution's board,
was a very narrow response to a narrowly defined aspect of the global debt
crisis.
This article discusses the SDRM, but is more concerned with the larger
scope of advocacy on debt issues by civil society movements over the last two
decades. While it does take up legal strategies being used in those efforts, it is
concerned with such tactics only in the context of the urgent calls for the
elimination of the destructive cycle of debt afflicting most of the countries of the
Global South. Its primary concern is to make the case that governments are
obligated first and foremost to protect the interests of their citizens, and
therefore should use the necessary politicalcapital at their disposal to repudiate
debt payments that handcuff their capacity to improve people's lives and inhibit
democratic self-determination of countries' most salient policy decisions.
I. THE REALITIES OF DEBT

External debt, arcane and dry as the subject may sound, has been a focus
for activist campaigns for more than twenty years. Debt has long been a grave
concern for people in the Global South-Africa, Asia-Pacific, Latin America,
and the Caribbean-because it is the reason given by their governments for
adopting harsh austerity programs that curtail public services and restructure
economies in harmful ways. For people in industrialized countries-the Global
Soren Ambrose learned about debt, the IMF, and World Bank while researching a dissertation on
Nigerian politics and literature at the University of Chicago in the early 1990s. He has worked
with 50 Years Is Enough: US Network for Global Economic Justice, a coalition opposed to the
IMF and World Bank, since shortly after its founding in 1994-first as a volunteer in Chicago and
then as a staffer in Washington. He is now the Network's Senior Policy Analyst.
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North--debt is an obvious entry point in understanding the global economy,
since it is their governments and the international institutions that their
governments control that are receiving the debt payments and imposing
conditions on countries struggling with impossibly large debt burdens.
The global debt crisis has turned the logic of development assistance on its
head. For every pound that wealthy countries provide as aid to impoverished
countries, thirteen pounds flow back in debt service payments. Developing
countries pay back well in excess of one hundred million dollars every day.
Africa, the continent worst hit by the HIV/AIDS pandemic, spends four times
more on debt payments than it does on health. Africa also pays about $13.5
billion in debt service annually, while experts have estimated that the amount
needed to fight HIV/AIDS on the continent is between $10 and $15 billion per
year.1 Despite the generous rhetoric officials often use about the HIV/AIDS
crisis, or more recently about the devastation caused by the December tsunamis,
there is no sign that this fundamental imbalance will be addressed.
If the loans the indebted countries are now paying off had worked as
intended-that is, if they had led to sustainable development-it would make
sense for the South to be paying more than it receives. But the grim truth is that
for over twenty years, countries have been stuck in a cycle of taking out loans to
pay off old debts. And every time they do so, their governments agree to a new
set of harsh economic policies. Ostensibly designed to lift the country out of
debt and poverty, the universal failure of these "structural adjustment programs"
("SAPs") since their widespread imposition in the early 1980s has exposed
structural adjustment as a tool to integrate developing countries into the global
economy, where they have played the role of providers of cheap commodities
and labor.
A. THE PERPETUAL DEBT CRISIS
The problem of excessive external debt in Southern countries first came to
global attention in the early 1980s, when the large Latin American economiesMexico, Argentina, and Brazil-were on a course to default on their
international obligations. At the time the greatest exposure, especially in Mexico,
was on the part of large private banks in the United States such as Citibank and
the Bank of America.2 Their political clout, and the fear that such massive
The statistics in this paragraph are drawn from two websites: Jubilee (UK), General Facts and
Figures: Rich World, Poor World, available online at <http://www.jubileeplus.org/databank/
sefulstatistics/generalstats.htm> (visited Feb 17, 2005); Jubilee (USA), A Silent War The
Devastating Impact of Debt on the Poor, available online at <http://www.jubileeusa.org/
ubilee.cgi?path=/earnmore/beginnersguide/&page=asilentwar.html> (visited Feb 17, 2005).
2

Consider Susan George, The DebtBoomerang:How Third WorldDebtHarms UsAII26 (Pluto 1992).
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defaults could destabilize the entire world economy, motivated the "international
community" to take action. Its solution was to pull in the IMF, which at that
time in its life was underemployed, but which had never involved itself deeply in
developing countries. The IMF assembled a large loan package for Mexico that
became the model both for the "bailout" loans that would become common in
the 1990s (such as those for Brazil, Russia, South Korea, Indonesia, and other
countries) and for structural adjustment programs.
The policy conditions attached to the loan to Mexico would appear in
subsequent IMF, and later World Bank, programs throughout the world:
reorientation of the economy to export production rather than "import
substitution," liberalization of trade and investment rules, privatization of
government-owned enterprises, layoffs of public sector employees, cuts in
public services such as health and education, reductions in subsidies, and hikes
in interest rates. In the approximately one hundred countries where the standard
IMF prescriptions have been imposed, debt burdens have skyrocketed, the gap
between rich and poor has widened dramatically, and in many places the
standard of living for the majority of the population has dropped precipitously.3
The loans to the large Latin American countries in the early 1980s gave the
governments cash to pay off their private creditors. With that, the Northern
media and decisionmakers declared the "debt crisis" over. But for most of the
world the debt crisis has not ended. The Latin American giants were the first to
be driven toward default because of the size of their economies and because
they had been targeted by Northern, and especially US, banks for large
development loans over a period of years. 4 The timing of the crisis was not
random: it followed the dramatic hikes in interest rates by the Federal Reserve
during the last years of the Carter Administration. In 1980, when the base US
lending rate hit 21 percent, governments around the world were thrown into
fiscal crisis. The Latin American countries had the largest loans outstanding to
politically influential banks, but throughout Africa, Asia-Pacific, and the
Caribbean, the same crises were occurring, albeit on a scale less threatening to
Northern financial interests. The oil price hikes orchestrated by OPEC in 1973
and 1979 had a similarly devastating effect, both on non-oil-producing countries

3

For a comprehensive charting of how structural adjustment programs have caused these impacts,
see Structural Adjustment Participatory Review International Network, StructuralAdjustment: The
SAPRIN Report-The Poligy Roots of Economic Cisis, Povery, and Inequality (Zed 2004). The book
highlights examples from countries in which a four-year initiative undertaken jointly by civil
society organizations, the World Bank, and national governments studied the cause and effect
relationship of IMF/World Bank policies and impact on poverty. Those countries include:
Argentina, Bangladesh, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ghana, Hungary, Mexico, the Philippines, Uganda,
and Zimbabwe.

4

Cheryl Payer, Lent and Lost: Foreign Creditand Third World Development 68-70, 84-85 (Zed 1991).
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that had to part with hard currency resources to keep their economies running,
as well as in oil-producing states where corruption accelerated s or civil wars
escalated.6
Since the beginning of the structural adjustment era in the early 1980s,
impoverished countries have continued to wallow in debt, as well as continued
to ply the treadmill of loans, conditions, rescheduling, and more loans while
poverty intensifies. Mexico, which was identified as having nearly recovered in
the early 1990s, was hit by its "peso crisis" in 1994 and had to borrow an
unprecedented fifty billion dollars and accept conditions similar to those
imposed in 1982. 7 Brazil likewise was forced to accept an IMF bailout package in
the late 1990s, and Argentina's complete economic implosion in 2001 after
serving as the IMF's model student for years is well known. The "miracle
economies" of South Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia were in 1997-98
at the center of the biggest international economic scare since the Great
Depression, and are only, in the last two years, extricating themselves from the
web of controversial and damaging conditions insisted upon by the IMF as they
took out over $120 billion in bailout loans.8 And during this entire period, the
less wealthy countries throughout the developing world were caught in similar,
less-publicized traps of borrowing, repaying, rescheduling, and extensive and
endless conditions.
External debt harms countries in two ways. Diversion of resources that
could otherwise be used for public services and poverty eradication is the more
obvious one, and is frequently the focus of debt cancellation campaigns. And
indeed, this diversion alone should be grounds for cancellation of debt in deeply
impoverished countries that should be feeding, housing, and educating their
people rather than shipping 25 percent-and sometimes more-of their national
revenues to wealthy Northern institutions. 9 But probably more important is the
inextricable link between debt and countries' vulnerability to the demands of
5

For example, Nigeria and Venezuela.

6

For example, Angola.

7

See Carlos Heredia and Mary Purcell, Structural Adjustment in Mexico: The Roots of the Crsis, in
Structural Adjustment and the Spreading Cisis in Latin America (The Development GAP 1995),
available online at <http://www.developmentgap.org/crisis.html#Mexico> (visited Feb 17,
2005).
See Shawn Donnan and Taufan Hidayat, Relief and Resentment as Indonesia Prepares to Graduatefrom
IMB-dictated Reform Programme, Fin Times 12 (Dec 19, 2003); and Philip Bowring, Turning Pointfor
Globaliaion:A Signalfmm Thailand,Intl Herald Trib 6 (Aug 7, 2003).

s

9

For example, Oxfam International reports that in 2001, Niger, rated second lowest on the UN
Human Development Index, was spending "over a quarter of its revenue on debt," and Zambia
spent "a quarter of its national budget" on debt in 2001. See Oxfam, Debt Relief: Still Failing the
Poor 2, available online at <www.oxfam.org/eng/pdfs/ ppO104_Debtrelief still failing the
poor.pdf> (visited Feb 17, 2005).
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multilateral creditors. An indebted government, viewed by private creditors as
not creditworthy, has little choice but to obtain a loan from the IMF or World
Bank if it wants to remain part of the global economy. Many countries have
signed up for multiple structural adjustment loans over the last two decades, but
no proof has emerged that more is better. The requirements of the IMF and
World Bank constrict economies and hit the most vulnerable people, especially
women and children, with disproportionate ferocity. 10
It may be argued that it would be irresponsible of the international
financial institutions ("IFIs") to make loans to governments without some
assurance that the funds would not be lost to corruption or wasted in a context
of unworkable economic policies. Very true, but the question is: what really are
sound economic policies?" The institutions' response is predictable, but the fact
that more than twenty years of structural adjustment programs yielded no proof
of poverty reduction, wealth accumulation, or recovery from economic crises
should make us question their wisdom. Is it possible that the IFIs simply do not
know what works in developing countries? Or is it that what would work for
developing country economies will always be subordinated to what serves the
interest of the most powerful forces in the global economy? Could it be that a
greater degree of flexibility-call it policy sovereignty, perhaps-is required if
governments are to find a model that works for their countries? So long as the
IMF and World Bank--or, more to the point, the G7 governments that control
them-are calling the shots, we will never be able to answer these questions.
Until the multilateral debt burden of the world's most impoverished
countries is eliminated, the hundreds of millions of people living in those
countries have little practical hope of having any sort of voice in determining the
economic policies they live under, and little chance of seeing those policies
structured to work in their interests. Multilateral debt looms as the most
important category of debt because the IMF, World Bank, and regional
development banks are accorded the status of preferred creditors, meaning that
governments are legally bound to prioritize payments to them over payments to
bilateral or private creditors. This advantage gives the institutions extra leverage
in imposing conditions and extracting payments and good behavior. Even more
importantly, the IMF has, by custom rather than by any formal legal agreement,
10

11

See, for example, Barbara Kalima, Gender and Debt, African Forum and Network on Debt and
Development, available online at <http://www.afrodad.org/archive/gender debt.htm> (visited
Feb 17, 2005).
A phrase employed habitually by IMF, World Bank, G7 and US government officials to describe
orthodox IMF/World Bank economic programs. See, for example, the statement issued by Under
Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs John B. Taylor after the February 2005 G7
at
<http://www.ustreas.gov/press/
online
available
meeting,
Finance
Ministers'
releases/js2230.htm> (visited Feb 18, 2005).
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been designated by creditors as the "gatekeeper" for development assistance.
This means that a government with questionable creditworthiness will only be
considered eligible for grants, loans, or credits once the IMF has signaled its
approval of the government's economic program, usually by releasing funds
under one of its formal assistance packages. The power of the IMF thus goes
well beyond the amount of money it lends, which is in fact relatively small in
global terms. The IMF is thus the most powerful arbiter of the economic fate of
most of the countries of Africa and the Caribbean, and a large number of
countries in the Asia-Pacific region and Latin America.
II. POPULAR CAMPAIGNS FOR DEBT CANCELLATION
It did not take long for people living in the countries forced into agreeing
to structural adjustment programs to make the connection to the tremendous
debt burdens attributed to their countries. Demands for debt cancellation were
part of most, if not all, of the campaigns and protests against economic austerity
programs from the early 1980s onward.12 Networks of organizations working in
different countries, such as the Debt Crisis Network in English-speaking
countries, came together to share analysis and create joint strategies that
included both Northern and Southern countries. During the 1988 IMF and
World Bank annual meeting in West Berlin, the largest ever demonstrations
against the organizations occurred and the top demand of the demonstrators
13
was debt cancellation.
The focus on debt that informed much of the economic justice activism
came into its own in the mid-1990s with the formation of the global Jubilee
2000 campaigns. The idea, born in the United Kingdom, was to make use of a
gimmick that would have global appeal over several years, the advent of the new
millennium, to advocate that the world take stock of its current condition and
remedy the injustices that contributed to poverty. Jubilee 2000 campaigns called
for a "one-off" cancellation of debts attributed to developing countries by the
end of 2000, in the spirit of the biblical notion of the jubilee, which called for a

12

The World Development Movement has comprehensively documented the history of protests
and movements against structural adjustment in the Global South through its three States of Unrest
reports. See World Development Movement, States of Unrest, available online at
(visited
Feb
17,
2005);
<http://www.wdm.org.uk/cambriefs/debt/unrest.htm>
(visited Feb 17, 2005); and
<http://www.wdm.org.uk/cambriefs/debt/Unrest2.pdf>
<http://www.wdm.org.uk/statesofunrest> (visited Feb 17, 2005).

13

See the de facto manifesto of the West Berlin demonstrations, A.G. Grauwacke, We Will Disrupt
this Conference! 2, available online at <g8resist.kommunikationssystem.de/trapese/content/txts/
past/o20mobilisations/Berlindoc.ReadOnly_.pdf> (visited Feb 17, 2005).
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reckoning every fifty years, at which time slaves were freed, farmlands allowed to
lie fallow, and debts forgiven.14
The mass action that the campaign called for was a recognition that appeals
to compassion and descriptions of the catastrophic impact of debt alone were
not going to convince those with power to take the necessary steps to end the
crisis. The key, as in most serious political campaigns, was to mount enough
public pressure to force politicians to take action.
The campaign took off quickly in the UK, winning the active involvement
of most of the mainline Christian religious denominations.15 Before long,
national campaigns were established in more than fifty other countries, including
the US. Even where the campaign was dominated by religious organizations,
secular groups, such as environmental, development, and solidarity organizations
also played key roles. The jubilee message did, however, make it difficult to
ignite the campaign in some Muslim countries-which was a little ironic, since
Qur'anic injunctions on debt from Qur'an are substantially more direct than
those of the Bible.
Worldwide, the Jubilee 2000 campaigns succeeded in obtaining more than
twenty-four million signatures on a petition calling for debt cancellation.
Numerous protests, lobby campaigns, vigils, and marches were held throughout
the world, targeting key national decisionmakers at IMF and World Bank
meetings and summits of the G7/G8 countries. The most visible single event
was the "human chain" surrounding of the G8 summit venue in Birmingham,
England, in 1998, an effort that required some seventy thousand participants
and forced Prime Minister Tony Blair to come out of the meeting to speak to a
Jubilee delegation to promise increased attention to debt6
The repetition of the encirclement idea in Seattle at the World Trade
Organization ("WTO") ministerial meetings in late 1999, involving about
twenty-five thousand people surrounding the building where delegates and
corporate sponsors were meeting one rainy evening, was largely glossed over
when the more assertive direct action maneuvers the next day captured global
attention. But Jubilee's strong presence in Seattle underlines its role in helping to
generate and launch the most visible episode in the history of the global justice
movement.

14
15

For the Jubilee campaigns' use of this verse, see <http://www.jubileeusa.org/jubilee.cgi?path=/
jubilee congregations> (visited Feb 17, 2005).
See The Birth of Jubilee 2000, available online at <http://www.jubileedebtcampaign.org.uk/

16

?1id=282> (visited Feb 18, 2005).
Consider
16
May
1998,

Jubilee

Debt

Campaign,

available

<http://www.jubleedebtcampaign.org.uk/?1id=280> (visited Feb 17, 2005).
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The Jubilee movement did not win the sweeping debt cancellation it
sought. But it did have a serious impact on international policy, and continues to
do so. The first sign of the heat that the campaign was generating came early: in
1996, shortly after the launch of the campaign in the UK, the World Bank
developed its first ever debt relief scheme, and after much lobbying managed to
convince the IMF to join with it. Called the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
debt initiative ("HIPC'", the program was controversial from the start. It was
widely praised for drawing virtually all of a country's creditors into designing a
solution, and some groups, including prominent members of the Jubilee
campaigns like Oxfam, gave it the benefit of the doubt. But a large number of
groups, including Jubilee 2000 Afrika, Jubilee 2000 UK, and the 50 Years Is
Enough Network, condemned it for its requirements that countries benefiting
would have to demonstrate a record of adherence to structural adjustment
programs and commit to undertaking even more structural adjustment before
receiving any relief. The arbitrary standards used for determining "debt
sustainability," and thus the amount of relief that would be accorded to a
country, were widely questioned and dismissed by many as far too stingy to
make a significant difference in the developing world's debt crisis.17
Sustained advocacy by Jubilee campaigners resulted in the "enhancement"
of the HIPC program, announced at the G8 summit in Cologne, Germany, in
1999. That move ensured that some fifteen countries were added to the six that
were part of the program before that time. Some campaigners welcomed the
announcement as a victory for debt campaigners, but in time most concluded
18
that the changes were insufficient.
Many of the Jubilee 2000 campaigns were scheduled to expire at the end of
2000. In most of those cases, successor organizations were formed and the
advocacy continued, but often with less funding and less media attention.
Nonetheless, the consciousness-raising accomplished by the campaigns and the
reputations they had secured have created space for the successor campaigns to
continue to influence many governments, and grassroots participation in the
efforts, albeit without the strong participation that churches once provided, has
continued to be impressive.
The most visible proponent of debt cancellation to emerge from the
Jubilee 2000 UK campaign's attempt to incorporate celebrity spokespeople has
been the Irish rockstar Bono. He has continued his debt advocacy, and in fact

17
18

For an overview of the critique of HIPC, see What's Wrong with HIPC?, Jubilee Debt Campaign,
available online at <http://www.jubileedebtcampaign.org.uk/?id=97> (visited Feb 17, 2005).
See, for example, European Network on Debt & Development, Eurodad Update on Debt and HIPC
(Apr 28, 2001), available online at <http://www.eurodad.org/articles/default.aspx?id=366>
(visited Feb 16, 2005).
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intensified it, since the formal ending of the Jubilee 2000 campaigns. He has
even founded his own organization, DATA (Debt, AIDS [or Aid, depending on
its campaigns at any given moment], and Trade-Africa). While DATA has
earned a dubious reputation within the community of economic justice
advocates, Bono's capacity to reach and influence Republican officials and
lawmakers in the US, even as the Bush Administration has been most fiercely
criticized as "unilateralist," has been unique. His positions do not always match
up with, for example, those of the Jubilee USA Network, but he has managed to
keep the issue in the headlines.
The work of DATA and the Jubilee successor organizations has now set
the stage for what could be a historic agreement on cancellation of multilateral
debt. The politics of the issue are being played out within the UK and US
governments, within the G7 countries, and now in the discussions over
assistance to the tsunami-affected countries. Activists were surprised at the
momentum generated at the G8 Summit in 2004, and had hoped, in vain, to see
an agreement reached at the October meetings of the IMF and World Bank. The
momentum still seems to be in place, however, and substantial campaigns, such
as that led by the Make Poverty History coalition of NGOs in the UK and the
Jubilee USA Network's in the US, are being mounted in the G7 countries to try
to ensure that a breakthrough is realized at the 2005 G8 summit in July in
Gleneagles, Scotland.
A. JUBILEE SOUTH
One of the most significant developments during the Jubilee 2000
campaigns was the formation of the Jubilee South coalition. 19 A significant
number of activists with organizations based in the Global South determined
that a separate voice for their agenda was needed after a series of disagreements
with some of the better-funded Northern campaigns. Of course, no country or
region is monolithic in its approach to a political problem, but a tendency for
Northern campaigns to focus on lobbying G7 governments and legislatures was
perceived as inadequate by many of the leading figures in Southern campaigns.
The tendency among the Southern campaigns was to focus more on calls for
sweeping, as opposed to incremental, solutions to the global debt crisis.
In October 1999, about 150 campaigners from several dozen Southern
countries convened near Johannesburg, South Africa to develop a Southernoriented Jubilee agenda. Out of that meeting the formal Jubilee South coalition
was born. It continues to function today, with a secretariat based at one of the

19

See Jubilee South's website, available online at <http://www.jubileesouth.org> (visited Feb 15,
2005).
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oldest and most successful debt campaigns, the Freedom from Debt Coalition in
the Philippines, and active regional caucuses in Latin America, Africa, and AsiaPacific.
Jubilee South distanced itself from the lobbying approaches targeting
wealthy governments and focused instead on organizing grassroots activists with
popular education and demands that included immediate and comprehensive
debt cancellation for all indebted developing countries, recognition of the
historical and ecological debts owed by the North to the South for over six
hundred years of exploitation, and reparations for those damages and those
caused by the perpetuation of the debt crisis.
Not all debt campaigns in the Global South are affiliated with Jubilee
South; some take a more conciliatory position regarding the debt initiatives
coming from Northern governments and institutions. But Jubilee South has
assumed a prominent position as the conscience of debt campaigns, particularly
in the period after the 2000 transition in the campaigns.
1. Illegitimate Debt
The central contention of Jubilee South and its Northern allies is that the
bulk, if not the totality, of the debts attributed to Southern countries are
illegitimate. This conclusion is based on the following facts:
- In many cases, the principal of the loans taken out has been paid back several
times over, with only the compounded interest keeping countries in debt. A
letter written by Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo is frequently cited by
campaigners: he says that during his first stint as President, in the late 1970s,
Nigeria borrowed five billion dollars. So far, says Obasanjo, payments on that
debt amount to sixteen billion dollars and the remaining debt is thirty-two
20
billion dollars.
- Many of the loans in question were made without any democratic review
process; often dictators simply negotiated for funds to pay for pet projects with
little consideration of the overall development impact or the prospects for
repayment.
• Funds from both private and public sources were frequently siphoned off
through corruption. As the recent corporate scandals in the US have
demonstrated, such problems are hardly unique to the Global South. In
nondemocratic, autocratic environments, corruption was often quite blatant,
but it exists even in the most democratic countries. The problem in the case of

20

Letter from President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria to Adrian Rogers, Chairman of the
Southern Baptist Convention (Aug 15, 2000). Scanned and reprinted in Uburu: Newsletter of the
Jubilee 2000 Africa Initiative, Issue #3 16-17 (Sept-Dec, 2000), available online at
<http://www.kwenu.com/archive/obj-baptist.htm> (visited Mar 14, 2005).
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development loans is that the people of the country are ultimately responsible
for repaying the debt, even if the money was never spent in the country, and
there is no bankruptcy procedure for sovereign debt. Among the most
notorious examples of this problem is Mobutu, the longtime dictator of Zaire.
The legendary magnitude of corruption in his government, supported by the
US as a bulwark against Soviet-supported Angola, was such that the IMF in
1982 decided to send a top-level official to Kinshasa for an extended period to
investigate the fate of the loans that the IMF made. His detailed report
confirmed that loans made to Zaire were sent directly to Mobutu's private
Swiss bank accounts, with little if any of the funds ever finding their way to the
borrowing country. Despite the report, the IMF and other official creditors lent
nearly $3 billion more to Mobutu before his overthrow in 1997, no doubt
because of the interest on the part of those who controlled the institutions in
maintaining Mobutu's regime. 21 Soon after Mobutu's departure, IMF officials
informed the new government that no assistance, and more importantly, no
signal of approval to other aid agencies would be forthcoming until the country
22
cleared over $10 billion in arrears.
- Many of the projects funded by international aid have failed to deliver the
benefits promised or turned out to be boondoggles (such as a nuclear power
plant built on a fault line in the Philippines and never used).23 The structural
adjustment loans that have manifestly failed to deliver on their promises
continue to increase debt burdens, with no opportunity to hold the institutions
that insisted on the conditions accountable for the outcome. Regardless of the
results of a loan, governments have no recourse to claim even partial
exemption from repayment. Since there is no status for national governments
analogous to personal bankruptcy, the debts stand until paid.
- Even in the case of successful development loans, the bulk of the money
involved often ends up in the pockets of contractors from Northern countries.
Indeed, much bilateral aid is "tied," meaning that the recipient is obligated to
use some of the funds to buy products and/or services from the donor
country. The World Bank assists client countries with procurement, through
offices dominated by Northern business interests that are fed important
information that allows them to position themselves as the most appealing

21

Joseph Hanlon, Take the Hit!, 312 New Internationalist 23 (May 1999).

22

Chris Talbot, Congo War Drags On-Ugandaand Chad Pull Out, World Socialist Web Site (May 14,
1999), available online at <http://www.wsws.org/articles/1999/may1999/cong-m14.shtml>
(visited Feb 15, 2005).
For more information, see the Freedom from Debt Coalition in the Philippines, Debt and

23

Destruction,
available
online
at
<http://www.freedomfromdebtcoalition.org/main/
pages/000310.php> (visited Feb 16, 2005).
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bidders. In fact, the Bank has long promoted itself to the US Congress on the
basis of the amount of money it ends up generating for US contractors; for
many years the amount of World Bank loan money coming into US businesses
exceeded the amount Congress allocated to the Bank by a substantial margin.
- The questions of historical and ecological debt pose profound moral
questions about the balance of costs and benefits over the years between North
and South. For some, the questions of uncompensated exploitation-slavery;
theft of gold, oil, tin, diamonds, and other valuable resources; human rights
abuses and political repression during colonialism; devastation of lands and
waters by petroleum companies-make the case for a reversal of the debt
burden hard to deny.
III. THE DOCTRINE OF ODIOUS DEBT
Many campaigners have tried to use the notion of odious debt as a legal
argument for cancellation of developing countries' external debts. A debt is
considered to be odious if it meets two thresholds: (1) the debt was contracted
without the informed consent of the country's people or their representatives;
and (2) the funds in question were used for purposes that contradicted the
interests of the general population.
The doctrine of odious debt was first employed by the United States
government after the Spanish-American War (1898), when it declared the debts
ostensibly owed by the former Spanish colonies of Cuba and Puerto Rico to
Spain to be null and void on the grounds that the supposed loans were actually
funds used by the Spanish to oppress the colonized peoples. The Spanish
government contested the US position, but, having been defeated in the war,
was in no position to persuade the emboldened US government. 4 The doctrine
was later codified by Alexander Sack, a Russian who was perhaps the preeminent
expert on public debt and state succession in the period between the world
wars.25 His work was used by the Costa Rican government in its successful effort
to disavow debts incurred by an overthrown dictator to British and Canadian
companies, a case that was submitted to arbitration by US Chief Justice William
Howard Taft, who decided in favor of Costa Rica in 1923.26
The doctrine fell into disuse and has not been explicitly invoked in several
decades. Recently, however, the US government argued for cancellation of the
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external debt of Iraq in terms very similar to those of the odious debt doctrine. 27
When debt campaigners leapt on the US government's logic, officials tried to
insist that the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein made Iraq a unique case, but the
campaign launched by the Bush Administration, which sent former Secretary of
State James Baker on a world tour to convince countries to cancel Iraq's
obligations, did not support that stance. 28 The French government, in objecting
to the US campaign, argued that a resource-rich country like Iraq should not be
granted special consideration beyond that accorded to the many deeply
impoverished and indebted countries in sub-Saharan Africa, Central America,
and Southeast Asia. 29 The US responded by calling President Chirac's bluff and
3o
proposing sweeping debt cancellation for a large number of those countries.
Although debt campaigners have not succeeded in encouraging any
indebted government to formally claim exemption from repayments under the
doctrine of odious debts, consciousness of the logic of that doctrine enabled
activists to turn the US position to the advantage of a range of indebted
countries.

IV. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CAMPAIGNS FOR DEBT
CANCELLATION

The 2004 G8 Summit in Sea Island, Georgia prompted a proposal from the
UK government to work towards 100 percent multilateral debt cancellation for a
range of impoverished countries. Many observers were surprised that the US did
not dismiss the suggestion out of hand. In the weeks that followed it became
apparent that the US government was coming up with a counterproposal that
would be consistent with its campaign on Iraqi debt and with its ideological
stance on the international financial institutions, which differs considerably from
the traditional view held by the UK and other G7 governments.
The UK's proposals call for the G7 and other wealthy countries to finance
debt cancellation by increasing the amount of money they contribute to the
World Bank and IMF, in effect replacing the funds that those institutions would
27
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no longer be able to expect from debtor countries. 31 This stance fits into the
conventional wisdom that sees the World Bank and the IMF as the best sources
of development finance, and institutions that should be maintained, and if
possible expanded, by the donor countries. The US, on the other hand,
proposed according 100 percent cancellation of multilateral debt for a
significantly larger group of countries than the UK's proposal, but financed from
IMF/World Bank resources.
At first campaigners were afraid that if a deal were reached on Iraqi debt,
the US would abandon its advocacy on debt. But shortly after the US
presidential election, an agreement to accord Iraq 80 percent cancellation-a
substantial step-down by the US, which wanted 95 percent-was reached. 32 And
even with the election and the Iraqi debt deal over, it appears at this writing
Qanuary 2005) that the US is pushing ahead with its proposal.
Observers have had little choice, then, but to take seriously the publicly
stated reason for the US' position-a difficult effort for activists not inclined to
give any credit to the Bush Administration. Treasury Department officials have
maintained that the US simply wants to rationalize the development assistance
system. That is, they recognize that the cycle of borrowing, rescheduling, and
repayments is costly and pointless. Better to acknowledge that the claims on
these countries simply cannot be paid, and that further assistance to the most
impoverished countries should be in the form of grants rather than loans, no
matter how generous the lending terms may be.
In essence, the Bush Administration seems to be saying that it wants to
make capitalism work more smoothly in every part of the global economy. In
countries that cannot survive without assistance, those funds should be made
available without requiring a financing structure based on a fiction of solvency.
But suspicion of the Bush Administration's agenda runs deep, and not
without reason, given its record of strident unilateralism. European governments
and civil society organizations suspect it of trying to cripple the international
financial institutions-where the Europeans have at least some influence over
international financial governance-by denying them additional contributions as
well as the flow of repayments that debt cancellation would eliminate. There may
well be some truth to that accusation. But advocates who have concluded that
loans from the IMF and World Bank often do more harm than good because of
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the associated conditions are not necessarily interested in ensuring that the
institutions remain fully funded. Indeed, in the case of the IMF, the US proposal
would largely remove it from making any loans to the most impoverished
countries by shifting all the money out of its "Poverty Reduction and Growth
Facility." Most activists would count such a move as a double victory: debt
cancelled and the IMF removed from the position of controlling Southern
33
countries' economic policies.
The competing proposals have created a division among both governments
and civil society organizations. The question boils down to whether it is more
important to preserve levels of aid, often in the form of loans with onerous
conditions, going to impoverished countries, than to achieve a sweeping
cancellation of existing debt. The US, German, and Japanese governments-the
three largest donors to the multilateral institutions-have all made clear that the
chances of getting the new allocations that would be required from them by the
UK plan to cover the cost of debt cancellation are very slim. It is not difficult,
then, to conclude that the US plan is the more realistic one-a happy enough
conclusion for those who believe that elimination of debt is worth a great deal
more than additional aid money.
The outcome of this debate may be known at the G8 Summit in July, or it
may continue to be discussed for months after that. It is entirely possible that no
deal will ever be reached, though in that case the UK has pledged to act on its
own and to try to influence other countries to join them. In the wake of the
tsunami disaster, calls for making sure that Africa is not left out, again, from the
increased generosity among donors, may serve as an extra point of pressure to
reach a deal in 2005.
A major campaign, "Make Poverty History," has been launched jointly by
most of the development-oriented civil society organizations in the UK, and is
being boosted also by the intervention of the United Nations, which is
encouraging civil society groups across the globe to use the fifth anniversary year
of the Millennium Summit to advocate for the "Millennium Development
Goals." 34 Unfortunately, the message on debt from both campaigns is somewhat
ambiguous, particularly given a prominent demand for increased levels of aid.
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But the intensified pressure generated by the campaign may well be key in
yielding results this year.
A. THE FAIR AND TRANSPARENT ARBITRATION MECHANISM
AND THE SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING MECHANISM

Since 2000, some debt campaigners have focused neither on lobbying
Northern decisionmakers nor mobilizing Southern grassroots forces. The
African Network and Forum on Debt and Development ("AFRODAD"), based
in Harare, Zimbabwe, and several European debt campaigning organizations, led
by Erlassjahr in Germany, have been trying to outline what the ultimate
resolution of the global debt crisis should look like. 35
These groups reason that even if the doctrine of illegitimate or odious debt
is broadly accepted, and even if a substantial portion of debt is cancelled,
developing countries will continue to require means of financing their
development projects. In other words, canceling debt today does not eliminate
the need to take out new loans tomorrow if a country wants to make forward
progress. Anticipating that exploitation and corruption cannot be totally
eliminated, these groups have asserted that what is required is a way of
adjudicating questions of debt in such a way that countries can demonstrate that
debts attributed to them should be considered illegitimate, creditors can argue
that contracts should be enforced, and destitute nations can reduce their debt
burdens when they prove too onerous to be repaid without unjustly penalizing
the country's people. These proposals, referred to as the Fair and Transparent
Arbitration Mechanism ("FTAP"), would make it possible, for instance, for a
country to effectively declare bankruptcy, see a portion of its debts forgiven, and
be restored to creditworthy status, just as is done for bankrupt individuals or
companies, or even local governments, in industrialized countries like the US.
In 2002, the "international community" began to discuss some kind of
arbitration mechanism in response to the massive default by Argentina. If that
country was ever going to reclaim its place in the global economy, it would have
to come to some arrangement with its private and public creditors that did not
require full payment of all its obligations. The IMF surprised some observers by
proposing a procedure by which, for the first time, the disposition of the debts
of a distressed country could be decided by a majority of its creditors, rather
than having to be negotiated to the satisfaction of each. This SDRM would
reduce the risk that governments could be held hostage by "vulture funds,"
35
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investment groups that purchase debt claims on the secondary market and then
sue the government for full payment, refusing to settle for what other creditors
may accept. The Peruvian government was forced to pay out fifty-eight million
dollars to one such fund in 2001.36
The SDRM was formally proposed by Anne Krueger, the Deputy
Managing Director of the IMF, and the top-ranking US official there. She staked
a great deal of her personal prestige on the idea, which was expected to be
received icily by US financial interests. Indeed, it was condemned by the
Institute for International Finance and other groups. 37 But the proposal was kept
alive by the support of Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill. 38 When discussed at the
annual meetings of the IMF and World Bank, no agreement on its fate was
reached. Soon thereafter, O'Neill was removed from his post, to be replaced by
John Snow, who let the proposal slide off the agenda, never to be heard of
39
again.
The SDRM was far from a "fair and transparent" idea. The IMF itself was
designated as the central authority guiding the process, despite its status as a
creditor. And it fell just as short of being a genuine mechanism of arbitration,
since the government of the indebted country would not have standing equal to
its creditors in the process. It was more a process of negotiation among
creditors, with the IMF designated to force a majority agreement at some point,
acting in what it saw as the best interests of the global economy.
The FTAP, on the other hand, would consist of a panel composed of
neutral parties and parties with clear sympathies with either the creditor or
debtor, in equal numbers. Both creditors and debtors would be given every
opportunity to make their case. The panel's decision would be binding and
would be required to take into account the interests of the people of the debtor
country.
The SDRM was almost a rare instance of a forcible change in international
financial arrangements imposed on powerful owners of capital by the
international community, modest as the proposal itself was. The FTAP, on the
other hand, would be a far more sweeping arrangement.
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The FTAP has few opponents in the advocacy community, but there are
very different approaches to promoting it. Campaigners in several European
countries, such as Germany, Austria, and the Scandinavian countries, and the
African Network and Forum on Debt and Development (Zimbabwe) have
decided to prioritize advocacy for the FTAP above any other advocacy for new
debt arrangements. Its proponents would not be likely to oppose any actual debt
cancellation, but believe that any cancellation that occurs through means other
than an FTAP represents a reinforcement of the unjust system that has come to
rely on gestures of charity by governments that retain nearly absolute control
over the financial and political relations between North and South.
Other campaigners view the FTAP as a fine aspiration, but an ideal which
is unlikely to be approached anytime soon. When the Northern countries that
control the global economy decide to institute a truly "fair and transparent"
arbitration system at its center, the revolution (if you will) will have already
occurred. The essence of the global economic system, from these activists'
perspective, is that it is unfairly controlled by the North. It seems exceedingly
unlikely that the system will be made fair through an appeal to adopt an idealized
system; rather, political pressure will have to be mounted that gives the
controlling powers little choice but to accept a new and just system for ordering
the global economy.
B. REPUDIATION
For many years, activists have wondered whether indebted countries could
cooperate to stage a mass refusal to pay the debts demanded of them. As the
saying, adjusted for inflation, maintains, "when you owe the bank ten thousand
dollars, they own you; when you owe the bank ten million dollars, you own the
bank." That is, the more the institutions need your money, the greater your
leverage.
Many factors have militated against any attempt to form a "debtors' cartel."
Trade arrangements, political treaties, geographical factors, competition between
Southern countries-there are many ways to divide a large group of
underresourced countries.
But that does not alter the conclusion that the strongest possible response
by debtor countries in the Global South is repudiation, whether jointly or singly.
Only by paying off the debts completely, or, more plausibly, through a proactive
refusal to participate in the unbalanced power equation, can governments begin
to chart their own course and frame policies responsive and accountable to their
people rather than to bureaucrats in Washington.
The cartel, once promoted regularly by Fidel Castro, has not been much
discussed lately among developing countries. But recent developments in trade
negotiations, and especially the successful united front that developing countries
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formed to stop the WTO from advancing its negotiations in Canciin in 2003
when Northern governments were unwilling to give up their agenda, have
fuelled a sense of the South's capacity to stand up for itself. Were a group of
Southern governments-for instance, the Mercosur countries of Brazil,
Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay, several of which have held their own in
negotiations with the IMF recendy-to agree to take a common stand against
paying the claims against them, it would be difficult for the Northern countries
to simply exclude all of them from the global economy. At the least, a strong
bargaining position would be established.
The Nigerian government in 2002 floated the idea of refusing to pay a
portion of its multilateral debt in order to devote the resources to HIV/AIDS
treatment. They were persuaded to give up the idea through a combination of
inducements and threats. Given the magnitude of the crisis in sub-Saharan
Africa, however, and given the warm reception to the suggestion by economist
Jeffrey Sachs at a recent African Union meeting that countries consider
4
repudiation in order to deal with that crisis and others afflicting the continent, 0
it seems plausible that someday soon a group of African countries will succeed
in taking the stance considered by Nigeria. The precedent set by such a move
would have the potential to shift the entire dynamic of debt, and with it the
foundations of the global economic system in the South. By taking such action,
African governments could effectively locate their power to rewrite the laws of
the global economy, perhaps not completely, but in a positive and
unprecedented direction.
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